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This paper provides a life-cycle framework for weighing up the insurance value of disability benefits
against the incentive cost. Within this framework, we estimate the life-cycle risks that individuals
face in the US, as well as the parameters governing the disability insurance program, using indirect
inference and longitudinal data on consumption, disability status, disability insurance receipt, and
wages. We use our estimates to characterize the economic effects of disability programs and to consider
how policy reforms would affect behaviour and standard measures of household welfare. Because
of high levels of false rejections associated with the screening problem, average household welfare
increases as the program becomes less strict, despite the worsening incentives that this implies. Incentives
for false applications are reduced by reducing generosity and increasing reassessments and these policies
also increase average household welfare, despite the worse insurance implied.
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The Disability Insurance (DI) program in the US is a large and rapidly growing social
insurance program o⁄ering income replacement and health care bene￿ts to people with work
limiting disabilities. In 2007, the cash bene￿ts paid by the DI program were three times
larger than those paid by Unemployment Insurance (UI) ($99.1 billions vs. $32.5 billions)1
and between 1985 and 2007 the proportion of DI claimants in the US has almost doubled
(from about 2.5% to almost 5% of the working-age population, see Autor and Duggan, 2006).
The key questions in thinking about the size and growth of the program are whether program
claimants are genuinely unable to work, and how valuable is the insurance provided. These
questions underlie the concerns that the greater use of DI explains the recent decline in labor
market participation of men and that the DI program is being used as a gateway for early
retirement, rather than providing insurance against health shocks that prevent work. To
assess these concerns and to evaluate the costs and bene￿ts of changing the DI program to
try to reduce disincentives to work, we need a realistic modeling of the risks that individuals
face over their life-cycle to their ability to work and their wages, and a theoretical framework
that captures both the insurance bene￿t of DI as well as the incentive e⁄ects on individual
behavior. The broad aim of this paper is to provide this framework and to use it to evaluate
the DI program quantitatively in an explicit life-cycle setting.
More speci￿cally, our paper makes three contributions. First, we propose a theoretical
framework that allows us to study in a life cycle setting the e⁄ect of disability risk on decisions
about labor supply, savings and applying for DI. We consider the problem of an individual
who faces two types of shock to wages: a permanent productivity shock unrelated to health;
and a disability or work limitation shock which reduces the ability to work. The distinction
between the two types of shock to wages is crucial for understanding the incentive problem
with the DI program: an individual with a disability shock above a certain threshold can
not work; while an individual with a productivity shock below a certain threshold may not
want to work. Since disability status is only imperfectly observable, either type may apply
for DI bene￿ts.
Second, we estimate the parameters of this model using microeconomic data. We use
PSID data on wages, indicators of disability status, receipt of DI, consumption and employ-
ment status to help identify the wage and health risks that individuals face, their preferences
1The relative size of DI is even larger if we add the in-kind health care bene￿ts provided by the Medicare
program to DI bene￿ciaries.
2and the parameters of the DI program. Almost half of the in￿ ow onto DI comes from those
aged under 50, and so the use of the PSID is important for studying this behavior and behav-
ior across the whole life-cycle, rather than using the HRS which is restricted to those aged
over 50. Our estimates highlight that there are substantial false rejections in the allocation
of disability insurance, while false positives are somewhat less problematic.
Finally, we use our model and the estimates of the structural parameters to analyse the
impact on standard measures of household welfare and behavior of varying the key policy
parameters. We focus on addressing how well insured are individuals against disability
risk, how responsive are the number of false applications, labour supply and savings to
changes in the details of the DI program, and what are the implications for average household
welfare. The ability to evaluate these questions in a coherent uni￿ed framework is one
of the main bene￿ts of the paper. We conduct counterfactual experiments by changing:
(a) stringency of the screening process, (b) re-assessment rate, (c) replacement rate, (d)
generosity of alternative social insurance programs. One striking ￿nding of our paper is that
the high fraction of false rejections (Type I errors) associated with the screening process of
the disability insurance program leads to ex-ante average household welfare increases when
the program becomes less strict, despite the increase in false applications that this implies.
This is because coverage among those most in need goes up. On the other hand, average
household welfare is higher if the generosity of DI is cut and if reassessment is more frequent:
both of these reforms have a large impact reducing the number of false applicants at little
cost in terms of reduced coverage for those in need.
The issues raised in this paper relate to the literatures on the incentives to make a false
application for DI and the disincentive e⁄ects of DI on labor supply. It also relates to a small
literature on the costs of disability shocks. Since disability status is private information, DI
evaluators make two types of errors: awarding bene￿ts to undeserving applicants, and denying
them to truly disabled individuals. The only direct attempt to measure such errors is Nagi
(1969), who uses a sample of 2,454 initial disability determinations. These individuals were
examined by an independent medical and social team. Nagi (1969) concluded that about
19% of those initially awarded bene￿ts were undeserving, and 48% of those denied were truly
disabled. More recently, Benitez-Silva et al. (2006a) using HRS self-reported disability data
on the over 50s, conclude that over 40% of recipients of DI are not truly work limited and
this adds to the picture of an ine¢ cient insurance program.
Suggested reforms to reduce these ine¢ ciencies either recommend preventing false ap-
3plications in the ￿rst place, or providing incentives or mechanisms to make false claimants
leave the programme. At the heart of this di⁄erent focus is the question of whether those
receiving DI unjustly were healthy (and hence could have worked) when they entered the
programme, or whether their health improved while on DI but they chose not to leave. The
incentive to make a false application rather than to work has been addressed by asking how
many DI recipients would be in the labor force in the absence of the program. Identifying an
appropriate control group has been controversial (see Parsons, 1980; Bound, 1989). Bound
(1989) uses DI applicants who were rejected as his control group. He ￿nds that only 1/3 to
1/2 of rejected applicants are working, and this is taken as an upper bound of how many DI
bene￿ciaries would be working in the absence of the program. These estimates have recently
been con￿rmed by Chen and van der Klaauw (2008). Relatedly, Kreider (1999) ￿nds that
although DI has important disincentive e⁄ects on labour supply, the e⁄ects due to changes in
DI generosity are not large enough to explain fully the fall in labour force participation. The
underlying assumption of these papers is that those who would be working in the absence of
DI are false applicants. To tackle false applications directly, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006)
propose introducing an asset test for recipients of DI because those who anticipate making
a false claim will accumulate assets to help smooth consumption.
Evidence on the e⁄ectiveness of incentives to move the healthy o⁄ DI is weak: Hoynes
and Mo¢ tt (1997) conclude via simulations that some of the reforms aimed at allowing DI
bene￿ciaries to keep more of their earnings on returning to work are unlikely to be successful
and may, if anything, increase the number of people applying for DI. In a similar vein,
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) and DeLeire (2000) examine the e⁄ect of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, which should have eased the transition back to work of the disabled, and
￿nd that it actually led to a decline in the employment rate of people with disabilities.
Benitez-Silva et al. (2006b) evaluate the e⁄ectiveness of a ￿$1 for $2 o⁄set￿policy, which
consists of reducing DI bene￿ts by $1 for every $2 of earnings above a certain level. They
￿nd that the policy encourages work by DI bene￿ciaries, but also encourages entry into
the program by individuals attracted by the greater generosity who would not have applied
otherwise.
There have been some recent papers identifying the extent of health risk which underlie
the need for a DI programme. DeNardi, French and Jones (2010) estimate the risk to
health expenditure, but their focus is on the elderly, rather than those of working age when
disability insurance is an active option. Adda, Banks and Gaudecker (2007) estimate the
4e⁄ect of income shocks on health and ￿nd only small e⁄ects. Meyer and Mok (2007) and
Stephens (2001) have estimated in a reduced form way the e⁄ect of disability shocks on
household consumption. Gallipoli and Turner (2009) explore in a structural model the e⁄ect
of disability shocks on consumption and labor supply.
More generally, however, the broader issue of the value of DI and the e⁄ects of DI reform
requires combining estimates of the risk associated with health shocks in a framework that
allows the evaluation of the insurance and incentives provided by DI. Previous work by
Bound et al. (2004), Waidmann et al. (2003) and Rust et al. (2002) has also highlighted
the importance of considering both sides of the insurance/incentive trade-o⁄ for welfare
analysis.2 Our work builds on these papers but extends them by modelling explicitly the
joint decision over whether to apply for DI and whether to work at di⁄erent ages across the
life-cycle, as well as an explicit measure of disability risk which allows for moderate as well
as severe disability. Further, we allow for a more ￿ exible speci￿cation of the wage process
and of preferences, and the addition of labor market frictions and interactions with other
social insurance programs. None of these elements are purely cosmetic: we believe this is
a necessary set-up to provide enough realism to capture the trade-o⁄s inherent in the DI
system. For example, negative productivity shocks unrelated to health (such as shocks to
skill prices), as well as a possible lack of employment opportunities, are at the root of the
incentive problem - both reduce the opportunity cost of applying for DI independent of health
status - and so we need such shocks alongside the risk of work-limiting disabilities if we want
to explain the decision to apply for DI when not disabled. Finally, the opportunity cost of
applying for DI depends on whether there are programs to ￿nance consumption during the
period it takes for an application to be processed, and on what alternative mechanisms of
insurance exist.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the life-cycle model
allowing for health status, and discusses the various social insurance programs available to
individuals. Section 3 summarizes the data used in the estimation of the model, focusing
on the data on disability status and on consumption. Section 4 discusses the identi￿cation
strategy. The key sections of the paper are Sections 5 and 6. Section 5 presents the estimates
of the structural parameters and discusses the e¢ ciency of the existing DI system. Section 6
carries out counter-factual policy experiments, reporting the e⁄ects on behavior and average
household welfare of potential reforms of DI. Section 7 concludes.
2See also Diamond and Sheshinski (1995) for a model of optimal disability insurance.
52 Life-Cycle Model
2.1 Individual Problem
We consider the problem of an individual who maximizes lifetime expected utility:
max





where ￿ is the discount factor, Et the expectations operator conditional on information
available in period t (a period being a quarter of a year), P a discrete f0;1g labor supply
participation indicator, ct consumption, and Lt a discrete work limitation (disability) status
indicator f0;1;2g, corresponding to no limitation, a moderate limitation and a severe limi-
tation, respectively. Work limitation status is often characterised by a f0;1g indicator (as in
Benitez-Silva et al., 2006a). We use a three state indicator to show the importance of distin-
guishing between moderate and severe work limitations. Individuals live for T periods, may
work T W years (from age 23 to 62), and face an exogenous mandatory spell of retirement of
T R =10 years at the end of life. The date of death is known with certainty and there is no
bequest motive.























where A are beginning of period assets, R is the interest factor, w the hourly wage rate,
h a ￿xed number of hours (corresponding to 500 hours per quarter), ￿w a proportional tax
rate that is used to ￿nance social insurance programs, F the ￿xed cost of work that depends
on disability status,3 B unemployment bene￿ts, W the monetary value of the means tested
welfare payment, DI the amount of disability insurance payments obtained, SSI the amount
of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) bene￿ts, and EUI, EDI, and EW are recipiency f0;1g
indicators for unemployment insurance, disability insurance, and the means-tested welfare
3The fact that disabled individuals face direct costs of work is explicitly recognized by the Social Security
Administration (SSA), which allows individual to deduct costs of work (such as ￿a seeing eye dog, prescription
drugs, transportation to and from work, a personal attendant or job coach, a wheelchair or any specialized
work equipment￿ ) from monthly earnings before determining eligibility for DI bene￿ts (see SSA Publication
No. 05-10095).
6program, respectively.4
The worker￿ s problem is to decide whether to work or not. When unemployed he has to
decide whether to accept a job that may have been o⁄ered or wait longer. The unemployed
person will also have the option to apply for disability insurance (if eligible). Whether
employed or not, the individual has to decide how much to save and consume. Accumulated
savings can be used to ￿nance consumption at any time, particularly during spells out of
work and retirement.





We set ￿ = 1:5 following Attanasio and Weber (1995), and estimate ￿ and ￿. To be
consistent with disability and work being ￿bads￿ , we require ￿ < 0 and ￿ < 0, two restrictions
that are not rejected by the data. The parameter ￿ captures the utility loss for the disabled
in terms of consumption. Participation also induces a utility loss determined by the value
of ￿. This implies that consumption and participation are Frisch complements (i.e. the
marginal utility of consumption is higher when participating) and that the marginal utility
of consumption is higher when su⁄ering from a work limitation.5
We assume that individuals are unable to borrow: Ait ￿ 0. In practice, this constraint
has bite because it precludes borrowing against social insurance and means-tested programs.
At retirement, people collect social security bene￿ts which are paid according to a formula
similar to the one we observe in reality, and is the same as the one used for DI bene￿ts (see
below). Social security bene￿ts, along with assets that people have voluntarily accumulated
over their working years, are used to ￿nance consumption during retirement. The structure
of the individual￿ s problem is similar to life-cycle models of savings and labour supply, such
as Low, Meghir and Pistaferri (2010). The innovations in our set-up are to consider the risk
that arises from disability shocks that cause a work limitation and the explicit modelling of
disability insurance.
There are important di⁄erences by skill level both in terms of probability of disability
shocks and disability insurance recipiency rates. In particular, if we proxy skill level by
4We do not have an SSI recipiency indicator because that is a combination of receiving DI and being
eligible for means-tested transfers.
5Lillard and Weiss (1997) also ￿nd evidence for ￿ < 0 using HRS savings and health status data. See
Finkelstein et al. (2008) for a recent attempt to measure the e⁄ect of health status on the marginal utility
of consumption using measures of subjective well-being as a proxy for utility.
7education, we ￿nd that individuals with low education (at most high school degree) and
high education (some college or more), have very similar DI recipiency rates until their mid
30s, but after that the di⁄erence increases dramatically. By age 60, the low educated are four
times more likely to be DI claimants than the high educated (16% vs. 4%). In part, this is
due to the fact that low educated individuals are more likely to have a severe disability at all
ages.6 To account for these di⁄erences, in what follows we assume that all the parameters of
the model are education-speci￿c, and much of our focus is on the low educated. To simplify
notation, we omit subscripts de￿ning the skill group of interest.
2.2 The Wage Process and Labour Market Frictions
We model the wage process for individual i as being subject to general productivity shocks








it + "it (1)
where L
j
it = 1fLit = jg, and
"it = "it￿1 + ￿it
Individuals work limitation status, Lit, evolves according to a three state ￿rst-order
Markov process. Upon entry into the labor market, all individuals are assumed to be healthy
(Li0 = 0). Transition probabilities from any state depend on age. We assume that these tran-
sition probabilities are exogenous and in particular, we rule out the possibility of individuals
investing in health prevention activities.7 We interpret "it as a measure of individual unob-
served productivity that is independent of health shocks - examples would include shocks to
the value and price of individual skills.
Equation (1) determines the evolution of individual productivity. Productivity deter-
mines the o⁄ered wage when individuals receive a job o⁄er. In our framework, individuals
make a choice about whether or not to accept an o⁄ered wage. This will also depend on the
￿xed costs of work, which in turn depend on the extent of the work limitation, F (L): In
addition, there are labour market frictions which mean that not all individuals receive job
o⁄ers. First, there is job destruction, ￿, which forces individuals into unemployment for (at
6See the Web Appendix for more details. This is available at
http://www.stanford.edu/~pista/papers/WA_LP.pdf.
7We allow the process to di⁄er by education, which may implicitly capture di⁄erences in health invest-
ments.
8least) one period. Second, job o⁄ers for the unemployed arrive at a rate ￿ and so individuals
may remain unemployed even if they are willing to work.
This wage and employment environment implies a number of sources of risk, from in-
dividual productivity, work limitation shocks, and labor market frictions. These risks are
idiosyncratic, but we assume that there are no markets to provide insurance against these
risks. Instead, there is partial insurance coming from government insurance programs (as
detailed in the next section) and from individuals￿own saving and labor supply.
2.3 Social Insurance
2.3.1 The SSDI Program
The Social Security Disability Insurance program (SSDI) is an insurance program for covered
workers, their spouses, and dependents that pays bene￿ts related to average past earnings.
The purpose of the program is to provide insurance against health shocks that impairs
substantially the ability to work. The di¢ culty with providing this insurance is that health
status and the impact of health on the ability to work is imperfectly observed.8
The award of disability insurance depends on the following conditions: (1) An individual
has to have ￿led an application; (2) There is a work requirement on the number of quarters
of prior participation: Workers over the age of 31 are disability-insured if they have 20
quarters of coverage during the previous 40 quarters; (3) There is a statutory ￿ve-month
waiting period out of the labour force from the onset of disability before an application will
be processed; and (4) Finally, the individual must meet a medical requirement, i.e. the
presence of a disability de￿ned as ￿Inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which can be expected
to result in death, or which has lasted, or can be expected to last, for a continuous period of
at least 12 months.￿ 9
This requires that the disability a⁄ects the ability to work; and further, both the severity
and the expected persistence of the disability matter. The actual DI determination process
consists of sequential steps. After excluding individuals earning more than a so-called ￿sub-
8Besides SSDI, about 25% of workers in the private sector are also covered by employer-sponsored long-
term disability insurance plans.
9Despite this formal criterion changing very little, there have been large ￿ uctuations over time in the
award rates: for example, award rates fell from 48.8% to 33.3% between 1975 and 1980, but then rose
again quickly in 1984, when eligibility criteria were liberalized, and an applicant￿ s own physician was used
to determine eligibility. In 1999, a number of work incentive programs for DI bene￿ciaries were introduced
(such as the Ticket to Work program) in an attempt to push some of the DI recipients back to work.
9stantial gainful amount￿(SGA, $1000 a month for non-blind individuals as of 2010), the
SSA determine whether the individual has a medical disability that is severe and persistent
(per the de￿nition above). If such disability is a listed impairment, the individual is awarded
bene￿ts without further review.10 If the applicant￿ s disability does not match a listed impair-
ment, the DI evaluators try to determine the applicant￿ s residual functional capacity. In the
last stage the pathological criterion is paired with an economic opportunity criterion. Two
individuals with identical work limitation disabilities may receive di⁄erent DI determination
decisions depending on their age, education, general skills, and even economic conditions
faced at the time the determination is made.
In our model, we make the following assumptions in order to capture the complexities
of the disability insurance screening process. First, we require that the individuals make
the choice to apply for bene￿ts. Second, individuals have to have been at work for at least
one period prior to becoming unemployed and making the application. Third, individuals
must have been unemployed for at least one quarter before applying. Successful applicants
begin receiving bene￿ts in that second quarter. Unsuccessful individuals must wait a further
quarter before being able to return to work, but there is no direct monetary cost of applying
for DI. Finally, we assume that the probability of success depends on the true work limitation














if t < 45
if 45 ￿ t ￿ 62
(2)
The medical requirement in the SSDI program imposes a severity and persistence require-
ment on the work limitation. In our model, the expected persistence of the work limitation
is captured by the Markov process assumption and is age dependent. This age dependence
is the reason why we make the probability of a successful application for DI dependent on
age.11 The survey question we use to identify the work limitation (described fully below)
asks individuals about work-related limitations rather than medical conditions or health sta-
tus more generally. Eligibility does not depend on whether an individual quits or the job is
destroyed.
10The listed impairments are described in a blue-book published and updated periodically by the SSA
(￿Disability Evaluation under Social Security￿ ). The listed impairments are physical and mental conditions
for which speci￿c disability approval criteria has been set forth or listed (for example, Amputation of both
hands, Heart transplant, or Mental retardation, de￿ned as full scale IQ of 59 or less, among other things).
11The separation at age 45 takes also into account the practical rule followed by DI evaluators in the the
last stage of the DI determination process (the so-called Vocational Grid, see Appendix 2 to Subpart P of
Part 404￿ Medical-Vocational Guidelines, as summarized in Chen and van der Klaauw, 2008).
10Individuals leave the disability program either voluntarily (which in practice means into
employment) or following a reassessment of the work limitation and being found to be able to
work (based on (2)). The probability of being reassessed is 0 for the ￿rst year, then is given
by P Re, which is independent of L and age. If an individual is not successful on application
or if an individual is rejected on reassessment, the individual has to remain unemployed
until the next quarter before taking up a job. Individuals can only re-apply in a subsequent
unemployment spell, where again the probability of success is determined by (2).
SSDI bene￿ts are calculated in essentially the same fashion as Social Security retirement
bene￿ts. Bene￿ciaries receive indexed monthly payments equal to their Primary Insurance
Amount (PIA), which is based on taxable earnings averaged over the number of years worked
(known as AIME). Caps on the amount that individuals pay into the DI system as well as
the nature of the formula determining bene￿ts (see equation 3 below) make the system
progressive. Because of the progressivity of the bene￿ts and because individuals receiving
SSDI also receive Medicare bene￿ts after two years, the replacement rates are substantially
higher for workers with low earnings and those without employer-provided health insurance.
However, bene￿ts are independent of the extent of the work limitation.
In the model, we set the value of the bene￿ts according to the actual schedule in the US






0:9 ￿ a1 + 0:32 ￿ (wi ￿ a1)
0:9 ￿ a1 + 0:32 ￿ (a2 ￿ a1) + 0:15 ￿ (wi ￿ a2)
0:9 ￿ a1 + 0:32 ￿ (a2 ￿ a1) + 0:15(a3 ￿ a2)
if wi ￿ a1
if a1 < wi ￿ a2
if a2 < wi ￿ a3
if wi > a3
(3)
where wi is average earnings computed before the time of the application and a1, a2, and
a3 are thresholds we take from the legislation.12 We assume wi can be approximated by the
value of the permanent wage at the time of the application.
To understand our characterization of the application process and the trade-o⁄ between
genuine applicants and non-genuine applicants, consider the following example. Assume
that the government receives a noisy signal Sit about the true disability status of a DI
applicant (independent of non-health related productivity "it), and that its decision rule is
to award bene￿ts to applicants whose signal exceed a certain stringency threshold, Sit > S.
Some individuals whose actual disability is less severe than S may nonetheless wish to
apply for DI if their productivity is su¢ ciently low because the government only observes
12In reality what is capped is wi (the AIME), because annual earnings above a certain threshold are not
subject to payroll taxation. We translate a cap on AIME into a cap on DI payments.
11Sit; a noisy measure of the true disability status. In contrast, some individuals with true
disability status above the threshold may not apply because they are highly productive
(they have high realizations of "it) despite their disability. Given the opportunity cost of
applying for DI, these considerations suggest that applicants will be predominantly low
productivity individuals or those with severe work limitations (see Black et al., 2004, for a
related discussion).
Benitez-Silva et al. (2006a) characterize in a compelling way the extent of false claimants
in disability insurance applications. In particular, they show that 40% of recipients do not
conform to the criterion of the SSA. This raises the question of whether the ￿cheaters￿are
not at all disabled or whether they have only a partial disability. With our characterization
of individuals as falling into categories severely restricted (L = 2) and at least partially
restricted (L = 1), we are able to explore this issue.
The criteria quoted above speci￿es ￿any substantial gainful activity￿ : this refers to a
labour supply issue. However, it does not address the labour demand problem. Of course,
if the labour market is competitive this will not be an issue because workers can be paid
their marginal product whatever their productivity level. In the presence of imperfections,
however, the wage rate associated with a job may be above the disabled individual￿ s marginal
productivity. The Americans with Disability Act (1990) tries to address this question but
that tackles the issue only for incumbents who become disabled.
2.3.2 Unemployment Insurance
We assume that unemployment bene￿ts are paid only for the quarter immediately following
job destruction. Unemployment insurance is paid only to people who have worked in the
previous period, and only to those who had their job destroyed (job quitters are ineligible for
UI payments, and we assume this can be perfectly monitored). We assume Bit = b￿wit￿1h;
subject to a cap, and we set the replacement ratio b = 75%. This replacement ratio is set at
this high value because the payment that is made is intended to be of a similar magnitude
to the maximum available to someone becoming unemployed. This simplifying assumption
means that, since the period of choice is one quarter, unemployment bene￿t is like a lump-
sum payment to those who exogenously lose their job and so does not distort the choice
about whether or not to accept a new job o⁄er. Similarly, there is no insurance against the
possibility of not receiving a job o⁄er after job loss.
122.3.3 Universal Means-Tested Program
The universal means-tested program is an anti-poverty program providing a ￿ oor to income
for all individuals, similar to the actual food stamps program but with three important
di⁄erences. First, means-testing is on household income rather than on income and assets;
second, the program provides a cash bene￿t rather than a bene￿t in kind; and third, we
assume there is 100% take-up.13 Gross income is given by
y
gross














(1 ￿ Pit) (4)
giving net income as y = (1 ￿ ￿w)ygross ￿ d, where d is the standard deduction that people
are entitled to when computing net income for the purpose of determining food stamp
allowances. The value of the program is then given by
Wit =
￿









The maximum value of the payment, T, is set assuming a household with two adults and
two children. The term y is the poverty line and so only people with net earnings below the
poverty line are eligible.
As we discuss below, this means-tested program interacts in complex ways with disability
insurance: the Food Stamps program provides a consumption ￿ oor during application for DI,
and an alternative mechanism for income support for those of low productivity.
2.3.4 Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
Individuals who are deemed to be disabled according to the rules of the DI program and who
have income (comprehensive of DI bene￿ts but excluding the value of food stamps) below the
threshold that would make them eligible for food stamps receive also supplemental security
income (SSI). The SSI program in the US is designed to help aged and disabled people who
have little or no income. The de￿nition of disability in the SSI program is identical to the
one for the DI program. The de￿nition of low income is similar to the one used for the Food
Stamps program.14 We assume that SSI generosity is identical to the means-tested program.
13The di¢ culty with allowing for an asset test in our model is that there is only one sort of asset which
individuals use for retirement saving as well as for short-term smoothing. In reality, the asset test applies
only to liquid wealth and thus excludes pension wealth (as well as real estate wealth and other durables).
14In particular, individuals must have income below a ￿countable income limit￿ , which typically is slightly
below the o¢ cial poverty line (Daly and Burkhauser, 2003). As in the case of Food Stamp eligibility, SSI
eligibility also has an asset limit which we disregard (see note 13).
132.3.5 Taxation on Earnings
We hold the government budget de￿cit, ￿ D; constant when varying parameters of the social
insurance programmes. This is achieved by adjusting the proportional payroll tax, ￿w; such
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where q is the cost of undertaking a reassessment of an individual on disability, and Reit is
an indicator of whether such a reassessment has been undertaken.15 This is done iteratively
because labor supply and DI application decisions change as a consequence of changes in
government policy.
2.4 Solution
There is no analytical solution for our model. Instead, the model must be solved numerically,
beginning with the terminal condition on assets, and iterating backwards, solving at each
age for the value functions conditional on work status. The solution method is discussed in
more detail in the Web Appendix. Here we describe the main features of the algorithm used.
We start by constructing the value functions for the individual when employed and when
out of work. When employed, the state variables are fAit;"it;Litg; corresponding to current
assets, individual productivity and work limitation status. We denote the value function
when employed as V e. When unemployed, there are three alternative discrete states the
individual can be: unemployed and not applying for disability (denoted V n); unemployed
and applying for disability (V App); or unemployed and already receiving disability insurance
(V Succ). We describe here the speci￿cation of the value function when employed and leave
the discussion of the other value functions to the Web Appendix. The value function if
working can be written as:
15For the period 2004-2008, the SSA spent $3.985 billion to conduct 8.513 million ￿continuing disability
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it+1 is an indicator for whether the individual is eligible to apply for DI (at the end
of the unemployment spell). Our model has discrete state variables for: Wage productivity,
Work limitation status, Participation, Eligibility to apply for DI (if not working), and Length
of time on DI (over 1 year or less than 1 year). The only continuous state variable is assets. In
the value functions above, the choice of participation status is determined by the maximum
of the conditional value functions.16
2.5 Structural Parameters to Estimate
To summarize, there are four sets of structural parameters that we want to estimate (sep-
arately by education). The ￿rst set includes parameters characterizing risk: Disability risk
(the probability of having a work limitation in t, given past health), the e⁄ect of disability on
wages (’1 and ’2 in equation (1)), and productivity risk ￿2
￿. The second set is labor market
frictions: The job destruction rate ￿;the arrival rate of job o⁄ers when unemployed ￿, and
the ￿xed cost of work F (L). The third set of parameters characterize the DI policy parame-










L=2), and the probability of reassessment while on DI, P Re.
The ￿nal set of parameters is preferences: The utility cost of a work limitation ￿, the disu-
tility of work ￿, the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion ￿ and the discount rate ￿. As we
will discuss later, some of these parameters will be set to realistic values (taken from the
literature) rather than estimated.
16Value functions are increasing in assets At but they are not necessarily concave, even if we condition
on labor market status in t: The non-concavity arises because of changes in labor market status in future
periods: the slope of the value function is given by the marginal utility of consumption, but this is not
monotonic in the asset stock because consumption can decline as assets increase and expected labor market
status in future periods changes. This problem is also discussed in Lentz and Tranaes (2005) and in Low et
al. (2010).
153 Data
We conduct our empirical analysis using longitudinal data from the 1986-1993 Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID).17 The PSID o⁄ers repeated, comparable annual data on disability
status, disability insurance recipiency, earnings, and food consumption. Its main disadvan-
tage is that the sample of people likely to have access to disability insurance is small and
there may be some questions about the variables that de￿ne the disability (or work limita-
tion) status of an individual, especially in comparison to the de￿nition of disability of the
Social Security Administration. Nevertheless, the PSID matches quite well a number of facts
and aggregate statistics. For example, estimates of disability rates in the PSID are similar
to those obtained in other, larger data sets (CPS, SIPP, NHIS - and HRS conditioning on
age, see Bound and Burkhauser, 1999). Moreover, PSID disability insurance rates by age
compare well with aggregate data (see Web Appendix). The match is good also in the time
series. In the population, the proportion of people on DI has increased from 2.4% to 4.3%
between 1985 and 2005. In the PSID the increase between 1985 and 2005 is from 2.4% to
4.5%.
The PSID sample we use excludes the Latino sub-sample, female heads, and people
younger than 23 or older than 62. We also exclude those with missing reports on education,
the state of residence, the self-employed, those with less than 3 years of data, and some
hourly wage outliers (those with an average hourly wage that is below half the state-level
minimum wage and those whose hourly wage declines by more than 75% or grows by more
than 400%).18 Given that the timing of the work limitation question does not coincide with
the timing of the DI receipt question (the former refers to the time of the interview, the
latter to the previous calendar year), we also lose the ￿rst cross-section of data for each
individual.
Disability Data We de￿ne a discrete indicator of work limitation status (Lit), based on
the following questions: (1) Do you have any physical or nervous condition that limits the
type of work or the amount of work you can do? To those answering ￿Yes￿ , the interviewer
then asks: (2) Does this condition keep you from doing some types of work? The possible
17Due to the retrospective nature of the questions on earnings and consumption, this means our data refer
to the 1985-1992 period. We use labor income data before 1985 to construct a measure of permanent income
for each individual and each year after 1985. We are unable to use more recent data because between 1993
and 2005 we do not have details on which household member receives DI, although such degree of detail may
be available in future releases of the data set.
18The hourly wage is de￿ned as annual earnings/annual hours.
16answers are: ￿Yes￿ , ￿No￿ , or ￿Can do nothing￿ . Finally, to those who answer ￿Yes￿or ￿No￿ ,
the interviewer then asks: (3) For work you can do, how much does it limit the amount of
work you can do? The possible answers are: ￿A lot￿ , ￿Somewhat￿ , ￿Just a little￿ , or ￿Not
at all￿ .
We use answers to these questions to distinguish between having no work limitation
(Lit = 0), a moderate limitation (Lit = 1) and a severe limitation (Lit = 2). We assume that
those without a work limitation either answer ￿No￿to the ￿rst question or ￿Not at all￿to
the third question. Of those that answer ￿Yes￿to the ￿rst question, we classify as severely
limited those who answer question 2 that they ￿can do nothing￿ and those that answer
question 3 that they are limited ￿a lot￿ . The rest have a moderate limitation: their answer
to question 3 is that they are limited either ￿somewhat￿or ￿just a little￿ . This distinction
between severe and moderate disability enables us to target our measure of work limitation
more closely to that intended by the SSA. In particular, we interpret the SSA criterion as
intending DI for the severely work limited rather than the moderately work limited.
The validity of these self-reports is somewhat controversial for two reasons: ￿rst, indi-
viduals may over-estimate their work limitation in order to justify their disability payments
or their non-participation in the labour force. Second, health status may be endogenous,
and non-participation in the labour force may a⁄ect health (either positively or negatively).
Regarding the ￿rst criticism, Bound and Burkhauser (1999) survey a number of papers that
show that self-reported measures are highly correlated with clinical measures of disability.
Benitez-Silva et al. (2004) show that self-reports are unbiased predictors of the de￿nition of
disability used by the SSA. Burkhauser and Daly (1996) show that the employment trends
for working-age men and women found in the CPS and the NHIS based on a work limitation
de￿nition of disability yields trends in employment rates between 1983 and 1996 that are
not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from the employment trends for the broader population of people
with an impairment. See however Kreider (1999) and Kreider and Pepper (2007) for evi-
dence based on bound identi￿cation that disability is over-reported among the unemployed.
Table 1 adds to the evidence in support of our self-reported measure of work limitation.
As in Burkhauser and Daly (1996), we use the 1986 PSID health supplement to show how
objective measures of limitation vary with self-reported status, but we distinguish between
reports of severe and moderate limitations. Table 1 shows that our distinction between a
severe and moderate disability is correlated with objective measures.
Regarding the second criticism of the endogeneity of health status, Stern (1990) and
17Table 1: Validity of Self-Reported Disability Status
Objective indicator No disability Moderate Severe
L = 0 L = 1 L = 2
Trouble walking/climbing stairs 7% 58% 79%
Trouble bending/lifting objects 4% 45% 75%
Unable to drive car 0% 9% 33%
Trouble with eyesight 2% 5% 16%
Need travel assistance 0% 2% 27%
Need to stay inside 0% 5% 28%
Con￿ned to chair/bed 0% 5% 26%
Limited in physical activity 12% 80% 94%
Spent some time in hospital 5% 24% 35%
Average # of days in hospital 0.36 1.78 14.49
Notes: The sample is male heads of household, aged 23-62. Data refer to 1986.
Bound (1991) both ￿nd positive e⁄ects of non-participation on health, but the e⁄ects are
economically small. Further, Smith (2004) ￿nds that income does not a⁄ect health once one
controls for education.
Disability Insurance To identify whether an individual in the PSID is receiving disability
insurance, we use a question that asks whether the amount of social security payments
received was due to disability.19 This question is asked from the 1986 wave onwards. Prior
to 1986, the question was not targeted to the head of the household, and so we cannot
distinguish the recipient of the insurance.
Consumption Data One di¢ culty with the PSID is that the consumption in the data
refers only to food. By contrast, in the model, the budget constraint imposes that over the
lifetime, all income is spent on (non-durable) consumption. To compare consumption in the
model to consumption in the data, we obtain non-durable consumption in the data with
an imputation procedure that uses a regression for nondurable consumption estimated with
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) data.
The CEX sample we construct to do the imputation of consumption tries to mimic as
19The survey ￿rst asks the amount of Social Security payments received in year t by the year t + 1
head. Then, it asks Was that disability, retirement, survivor￿ s bene￿ts, or what?. Possible responses are: 1)
Disability, 2) Retirement, 3) Survivor￿ s bene￿ts; dependent of deceased recipient, 4) Dependent of disabled
recipient, 5) Dependent of retired recipient, 6) Other, 7) Any combination of the codes above.
18closely as possible the sample selections we impose in the PSID. Hence, our CEX sample
includes only families headed by a male, reporting data between 1986 and 1992, with no
missing data on the region of residence, aged 23 to 62, not self-employed, reporting data
for all interviews (so an annual measure of consumption can be constructed), with complete
income response, non-zero consumption of food, and not living in student housing.








where F is food consumption.
We use a third-degree polynomial in lnF and control for a cubic in age, number of
children, family size, dummies for white, education, region, year, a quadratic in log before-
tax family income, labor market participation status, a disability status indicator of whether
the head is ￿ill, disabled, or unable to work￿ , an indicator for whether the head is receiving
social security payments (which for workers aged 62 or less should most likely capture DI),
and interactions of the disability status indicator with log food, log income, a dummy for
white, the DI indicator, and a quadratic in age. The R2 of the regression is 0.79.








This is the measure of consumption we use in the analysis that follows.
Sample Statistics Table 2 reports some sample statistics for individuals by work limi-
tation status and by education (using sampling weights throughout), where low education
is de￿ned as high school graduate or less. Regardless of education, the disabled are older,
less likely to be married or white, with a smaller family, less likely to be working, and more
likely to be on DI. Their family income, wages, and food spending are lower, but income
from transfers (both private and public transfers) is higher. The high educated have higher
participation rates and lower DI recipiency rates.
Most of the structural analyses of DI errors have used HRS or SIPP data. Benitez-
Silva et al. (2004) use the HRS, which has the advantage over the PSID of asking very
detailed questions on disability status and DI application, minimizing measurement error
and providing a direct (reduced form) way of measuring errors. However, the HRS samples
19Table 2: Sample Statistics by Work Limitation Status
Low Education High Education
L = 0 L = 1 L = 2 L = 0 L = 1 L = 2
Age 40.28 44.80 48.81 39.46 42.69 46.07
% Married 0.79 0.84 0.69 0.77 0.72 0.61
% White 0.84 0.90 0.80 0.91 0.92 0.76
Family size 3.01 3.16 2.61 2.92 2.70 2.57
Family income 43,912 39,715 26,416 66,945 51,728 36,098
Income from transfers 1,758 4,667 10,284 1,637 4,700 11,358
% Working now 0.90 0.71 0.15 0.94 0.77 0.44
% Annual wages > 0 0.97 0.81 0.19 0.98 0.89 0.48
HoursjHours>0 2,140 1,941 1,358 2,228 2,039 1,742
WagesjHours>0 29,618 24,518 14,718 45,713 33,447 28,365
Hourly wage 12.64 11.78 9.33 19.33 15.60 14.68
% DI recipient 0.01 0.08 0.52 0.00 0.03 0.31
Food spending 5,352 5,223 4,198 6,232 5,738 5,223
N 9,112 784 635 8,003 415 171
Notes: monetary values are in 1992$; the sample is male heads of household, aged 23-62.
Male workers aged <50
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Figure 1: Proportion of new DI awards
20only from a population of older workers and retirees (aged above 50). This is an important
limitation because the high current levels of DI were associated with sharp increases in the
￿ ow-on rates for the under-50s: Figure 1 shows that male workers younger than 40 account
for 20 to 25% of new entrants in the Disability Insurance program in recent years, and
between 40% and 50% of new entrants are under 50. We use the PSID to understand this
behavior because it samples individuals from all ages and follows them across their life-cycle.
The SIPP has the advantage over the PSID of being a much larger data set, but it lacks any
consumption data. This is problematic because an important element of our model is the
state dependence in utility induced by health.
4 Identi￿cation
Identi￿cation of the unknown parameters proceeds in a number of steps. First, we estimate
disability risk directly from transitions between disability states. Second, we estimate the
e⁄ect of disability on wages using wage data, controlling for selection into work. Third,
we estimate productivity risk from unexplained innovations to wages, again controlling for
selection into work. Finally, we use indirect inference for the remaining parameters: prefer-
ences, labour market frictions, and the parameters that characterize the disability insurance
process. To do this, we use a range of auxiliary equations: coe¢ cients from a consumption
regression, participation over the life-cycle, health status of DI recipients and the DI status
of individuals of di⁄erent health.
4.1 Disability Risk
Disability risk is independent of any choices made by individuals in our model, and is also
independent of productivity shocks. This means that the disability risk process can be
identi￿ed structurally without indirect inference. By contrast, the same is not true for the
variance of wage shocks: because wages are observed only for workers, wage shocks are
identi￿ed using a selection correction.
4.2 The Wage Process







it + "it + !it (7)
21with "it = "it￿1 + ￿it as before. We make the assumption that the two errors ￿it and !it
are independent. Based on evidence from e.g., Bound and Krueger (1995), we assume that
the measurement error !it may be serially correlated (an MA(1) process). Our goal is to
identify the variance of the productivity shock ￿2
￿ as well as ’1 and ’2. A ￿rst complication is
selection e⁄ects because wages are not observed for non-participants and non-participation
depends on the wage o⁄er. Further, non-participation may depend directly on disability
shocks as well as on the expectation that the individual will apply for DI in the subsequent
period (which requires being unemployed in the current period). We observe neither these
expectations, nor the decision to apply.
Our selection correction is based on a reduced form rather than on our structural model,
although the structural model is consistent with the reduced form. An alternative would be
to include the wage risk parameters in the indirect inference estimation but this is compu-









it + ￿Git + #it (8)
= sit + #it
where P ￿
it is the utility from working, and we observe the indicator Pit = 1fP ￿
it > 0g. Here
Git is a vector of exclusion restrictions: They a⁄ect the likelihood of observing an individual
at work (through an income e⁄ect and through a⁄ecting the expectation that the individual
will apply for DI in the subsequent period), but they do not a⁄ect the wage, conditional
on Xit and Lit. We assume that income transfers and an indicator of UI generosity serve
as exclusion restrictions. The unobserved ￿taste for work￿#it is freely correlated with the
















Under these assumptions, the wage for labor market participants is thus:
E (lnwitjP
￿
















assuming no selection on the measurement error. The Mills￿ratio term ￿(sit) =
￿(sit)
￿(sit), where
￿(:) and ￿(:) denote the p.d.f. and c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution, respectively.







it + ￿"#￿(sit) + vit (9)
only on the sample of workers, and with E (vitjP ￿
it > 0;Xit;Lit) = 0 (Heckman, 1979). The
resulting estimates of ’1 and ’2 should be interpreted as the estimates of the e⁄ect of work
limitations on o⁄ered wages.
4.3 Productivity Risk












From estimation of ￿, ’1 and ’2 described above we can construct the ￿adjusted￿residu-
als (10), and use them as they were the true adjusted error terms (MaCurdy, 1982). Assuming
for simplicity of notation that !it is i.i.d., we can then identify the variance of productivity
shocks and the variance of measurement error using the following moment restrictions:


















￿E (gitgit+1jPit = 1;Pit￿1 = 1) = ￿
2
! (13)
(see Low, Meghir and Pistaferri, 2010). Here ￿￿# denotes the correlation coe¢ cient between
￿ and # (which is not of direct interest). Standard errors are computed with the block
bootstrap.
4.4 Preferences and Disability Insurance Parameters
Identi￿cation of the remaining structural parameters of interest (￿;￿;￿;FL=0;FL=1;FL=2) and









L=2, and P Re) will be achieved
by Indirect Inference (see Gourieroux et al, 1993). Indirect inference is a simulation-based
method that is used when the relevant likelihood function has no analytical expressions.
This is indeed the case for our complex theoretical model. The di⁄erence between indirect
inference and other methods based on simulations (such as Simulated Method of Moments)
is that indirect inference relies on moments from an approximate model (known as auxiliary
model) which can be estimated on both real and simulated data, rather than on moments
23from the correct data generating process. The key idea behind indirect inference is that
the parameters of the auxiliary model are related (through a so-called binding function) to
the structural parameters of interest. The latter are estimated by minimizing the distance
between the parameters of the auxiliary model estimated from the observed data and the
parameters of the auxiliary model estimated from the simulated data. Any bias in estimates
of the auxiliary model on actual data will be mirrored by bias in estimates of the auxiliary
model on simulated data, under the null that the structural model is correctly speci￿ed.
However, the closer the link between the parameters of the auxiliary equations and the
structural parameters, the more reliable is estimation.
We use the following Indirect Inference auxiliary equations, which overall give us 30
moments: (1) Regression of log consumption on work limitation, disability insurance, par-
ticipation (and interactions), controlling for a number of other covariates; (2) Participation
rates, conditional on disability status and age; (3) Stock of recipients of DI, conditional on
disability status and age; and (4) DI status of people of di⁄erent age and health status.
The Indirect Inference statistical criterion that we use is:






















D are the moments in the data, b ￿
S (￿) are the corresponding simulated moments
(which we average over S simulations) for given parameter values ￿: The function ￿(￿) is
the binding function relating the structural parameters to the auxiliary parameters, and ￿
is the weighting matrix. The optimal weighting matrix is the the inverse of the covariance





Standard errors of the structural parameters can be computed using the formula provided
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but when we present standard errors, we calculate V using the simulated moments explicitly.
We calculate J by ￿nite di⁄erence.
In what follows we discuss the mapping between structural and auxiliary parameters.




. We compute standard errors (and the test of overi-
dentifying restrictions) using a formula that adjusts for the use of the non-optimal weighting matrix.
244.4.1 Moments: Disability Insurance
There are two ways in which we calculate moments involving the stock of DI recipients.
First, we consider the composition of DI recipients by health status. This identi￿es the
fraction of DI recipients who are not truly disabled and helps to pin down the incentive cost.
Second, we consider the DI status of individuals within work limitation-types. For example,
we use the fraction of those with a severe limitation who are in receipt of DI to help identify
the fraction of the truly disabled who bene￿t from the insurance. This fraction is related to
the parameter governing the probability of a successful application: it would be particularly
informative if all L = 2 individuals applied and no one left the programme. Of course, in
practice, the fraction who apply depends on the probability of acceptance and this is why we
need to use our model to identify the actual probability of acceptance rather than just taking
the observed fractions on DI as the probabilities of acceptance. For both sets of moments,
we condition on being younger or older than age 45.
4.4.2 Moments: Consumption Regression
Disability is likely to have two separate e⁄ects on consumption: ￿rst, disability a⁄ects earn-
ings and hence consumption through the budget constraint. The size of this e⁄ect will depend
on the extent of insurance, both self-insurance and formal insurance mechanisms, such as
DI. The extent of insurance from DI obviously depends on being admitted onto the program,
but conditional on receiving DI, the extent of insurance is greater for low income individuals
because of the progressivity of the system through the AIME and PIA calculation.
The second possible e⁄ect of disability on consumption is through non-separabilities in the
utility function. For example, if being disabled increases the marginal utility of consumption
(e.g. through increased needs) then consumption will rise on disability even if there is full
insurance and marginal utility is smoothed over states of disability.
It is important to separate out these two e⁄ects. Stephens (2001) calculates the e⁄ect of
the onset of disability on consumption, but does not distinguish whether the e⁄ect is through
non-separability or through the income loss directly.
Our method for separating out these two e⁄ects is to use the parameters of the following
auxiliary regression:











it + ￿7t + ￿8t
2 + ￿9Ait + ￿10Pit + ￿it
25The e⁄ect of a (severe) work limitation on consumption for individuals who are not in
receipt of DI is given by the parameter ￿3. This captures both the income e⁄ect and the
non-separability. For individuals who are in receipt of DI, the e⁄ect of a severe disability on
consumption is (￿3 + ￿4), and so (￿3 + ￿4) captures the preference e⁄ect induced by non-
separability.21 The split between ￿3 and ￿4 is clear when insurance is full. More generally,
if insurance is partial, then (￿3 + ￿4) captures both the non-separable part and the lack
of full insurance for those receiving DI. However, the degree of partial insurance through
DI depends on permanent income and age through the AIME formula. Indirect inference
exploits this identi￿cation intuition without putting a structural interpretation directly on
the values of the ￿ parameters. The coe¢ cients ￿1 and ￿2 correspond to the e⁄ects of a
moderate disability. We control for permanent income and age because we want to compare
individuals facing the same level of insurance through the DI system.22 We control for
unearned income to compare individuals with the same potential for self-insurance.
Participation in the labour force can also provide insurance against disability shocks.
In addition, participation has a direct e⁄ect on the marginal utility of consumption. We
use ￿10, combined with the average participation rates over the life-cycle, to capture this
non-separable component and the ￿xed cost of work.
4.4.3 Moments: Participation over the Life-Cycle
We calculate participation rates by age and by disability status. This is equivalent to run




 x1fageit 2 xg + ￿it
where pit is an indicator for whether a person is working at age t, x denote the age bands
and there are overall X age bands (we use four 10-year age bands: 23-32, 33-42, etc.). The
moments we use as auxiliary parameters are the  x estimated separately for the three work
limitation groups, so there are X ￿ L = 12 auxiliary parameters overall.
21A heuristic argument for identi￿cation is the following. A regression of consumption on work limitation
does not identify the non-separability e⁄ect because of the presence of budget constraint e⁄ects. However,
if we could ￿nd a group of individuals who are fully insured against disability shocks, then the consumption
response to disability would only capture preference e⁄ects. Our auxiliary regression is designed to capture
this idea through the interaction with the indicator for whether the disabled are insured through the DI
program.
22We construct Y P
it by using the information on individual wages available from entry into the PSID
sample until the particular observation at age t.
26These moments are related to ￿xed cost of participation with di⁄erent disabilities, F (L);
the utility cost of participation, ￿; and the labor market frictions. Frictions are identi￿ed by
average labor market participation and unemployment duration over the life cycle. Unem-
ployment rates in the ￿rst periods of the life cycle are informative about the job destruction
rate ￿ because assets are very low at young ages and so very few quit employment. The
di⁄erences in participation by disability status is informative about the ￿xed costs of work
and how these di⁄er by work limitation status (i.e., the extent that work is more costly for
disabled than for healthy workers).
5 Results
5.1 Disability Risk
Figure 2 plots selected Pr(Lit = jjLit￿1 = k).23 These are transition probabilities that are
informative about ￿disability risk￿ . For example, Pr(Lit = 2jLit￿1 = 0) is the probability
that an individual with no work limitations is hit by a shock that places him in the severe
work limitations category. Whether this is a persistent or temporary transition can be
answered by looking at the value of Pr(Lit = 2jLit￿1 = 2).
The top left panel of Figure 2 plots Pr(Lit = 0jLit￿1 = 0), i.e., the probabilities of staying
healthy. This probability declines over the working part of the life cycle from 0.97 to about
0.92 for the high educated and more rapidly, 0.96 to 0.88, for the low educated. The decline
is equally absorbed by increasing probabilities of transiting in moderate and severe work
limitations. The top right panel plots the latter, Pr(Lit = 2jLit￿1 = 0). This probability
increases over the working life, and the increase is faster for the low educated (rising from
1% to 4% vs. 1% to 2%). The probability of full recovery following a severe disability (shown
in the bottom left panel) declines over the life-cycle. For the low educated, such probability
is consistently below that of the high educated. Finally, the probability of persistent severe
work limitations, Pr(Lit = 2jLit￿1 = 2) (bottom right panel) increases strongly with age,
and more so for those with low education. In sum, the low educated face worse health risk
than the high educated group, with higher probabilities of bad shocks occurring and a lower
probability of recovery.
23To obtain these plots, we ￿rst construct a variable that equals the mid-point of a 10-age band (23-32,
33-42, etc.). We then regress an indicator for the joint event fLit = j;Lit￿1 = kg on a quadratic in the mid-
age variable, conditioning on education and the event fLit￿1 = kg. The predicted value of this regression is
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Figure 2: Selected (smoothed) Markov transition probabilities Pr(Lit = jjLit￿1 = k), by
education.
These di⁄erences across education, alongside the much greater prevalence of DI among
the low educated, are the reasons why we focus our remaining analysis on the subsample of
individuals with low education.
5.2 Wage Process
In Table 3 column (1) we report marginal e⁄ects from a probit regression for participation.
Participation is monotonically decreasing in the degree of work limitations. Among the
low educated, the probability of working declines by 13 percentage points at the onset of
a moderate work limitation, and by 55 percentage points at the onset of a severe work
limitation. Regarding our exclusion restrictions, the signs are correct: higher income from
transfers and a more generous welfare system increase the opportunity cost of work, and the
e⁄ects are statistically signi￿cant.24
In columns (2) and (3), we report estimates of the log wage process with and without
correcting for endogenous selection into work. The key coe¢ cients are the ones on fL = 1g
24To obtain a measure of the generosity of the UI program in the state where the worker lives, we rank
states according to the maximum weekly UI bene￿t (which we take from current legislation). Our measure
of generosity is the rank variable, which varies over time and across states. Income from transfers is the sum
of private and public transfers. We also used a measure that excludes transfers received by the head, and
￿nd virtually identical results.
28and fL = 2g; which are estimates of ’1 and ’2; the e⁄ect of the work limitation on wages. A
moderate work limitation reduces the o⁄ered wage rate by 21 percentage points, whereas a
severe limitation reduces the o⁄ered wage by 40 percentage points. The selection correction
to recover the o⁄ered wage from the observed wage makes a substantial di⁄erence. The
e⁄ect of a severe work limitation on the observed wage is 8 percentage points less than on
the o⁄ered wage: those who remain at work despite their work limitation have higher-than-
average permanent income (shown by the positive sign of the Mills ratio).
Table 3: The Log Wage Equation
Variable Participation Wage w/out Wage with
equation selection selection
(1) (2) (3)













































Mills ratio -.- -.- 0:079
(0:039)
N 10,531 9,542 9,542
5.3 Productivity Risk
We use the residuals of the wage equation to estimate the variance of permanent productivity
shocks as well as the variance of measurement error (and the MA(1) parameter, which turns
out to be statistically insigni￿cant), allowing for endogenous selection into work (expressions
(11)-(13)). The results are in Table 4. The numbers are similar to estimates reported
elsewhere (see Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004). This suggests that stripping out the variability
29in wages due to health shocks does not have much impact on the estimates of productivity
risk, presumably because disability is a relatively low probability event.








5.4 Estimates from Indirect Inference
In this section, we present results on the moments matched by Indirect Inference and the
corresponding parameters.25 All moments are presented in the three sections of Table 5.
The ￿rst section comes from matching DI policy moments: the work limitation status of
DI recipients (Panel A) and the work limitation status of DI recipients (Panel B) separately
for younger (age<45) and older workers (age￿ 45). Our model is capable of matching most
of the moments with great accuracy. For example, it matches quite closely the proportions
of ￿false recipients￿ , Fr(L = 0jDI = 1;t); as well as the proportion of workers ￿insured￿by
the DI program, Fr(DI = 1jL = 2;t), which are the reduced form equivalents of the incentive
cost/insurance bene￿t tradeo⁄. The second section of Table 5 reports the moments obtained
from estimating the auxiliary log consumption equation (using imputed data, as detailed
above).26 The signs and in most cases the magnitude of the coe¢ cients are similar. Finally,
the third section shows participation over the life cycle for people of di⁄erent work limitation
status. Our simulations match quite well participation of all disability types, but we do not
match the full decline in participation with age that is observed in the data, especially for
people with severe disability.
25We set some parameters to realistic values: the risk aversion parameter ￿ = 1:5, the annualised interest
rate is 1.5% and the discount rate 2.5%. A life-span is 50 years, from age 22, with the last 10 years in
compulsory retirement. The quarterly arrival rate is set to 0.73. Ideally, we would identify the value of ￿ by
using durations of unemployment by disability status. However, censoring problems, as well as noise when
we stratify by education and work limitation status, lead us to take the value of ￿ from Low, Meghir and
Pistaferri (2010).
26Our measure of consumption is per adult equivalent (using the OECD equivalence scale 1+0:7(A ￿ 1)+
0:5K, where A is the number of adults and K the number of children in the household).
30Table 5: Matched Moments
Section A: Disability Insurance Moments
Panel A: ￿Coverage￿ Panel B: ￿Composition of Recipients￿
Moment Data Sims Moment Data Sims
Fr(DI = 1jL = 2;t < 45) 28.2 27.5 Fr(L = 2jDI = 1;t < 45) 63.6 65.1
Fr(DI = 1jL = 2;t ￿ 45) 58.5 60.7 Fr(L = 2jDI = 1;t ￿ 45) 73.2 73.5
Fr(DI = 1jL = 1;t < 45) 5.8 5.7 Fr(L = 1jDI = 1;t < 45) 22.9 23.0
Fr(DI = 1jL = 1;t ￿ 45) 15.5 14.7 Fr(L = 1jDI = 1;t ￿ 45) 17.0 14.8
Fr(DI = 1jL = 0;t < 45) 0.23 0.24 Fr(L = 0jDI = 1;t < 45) 13.6 11.9
Fr(DI = 1jL = 0;t ￿ 45) 1.4 2.2 Fr(L = 0jDI = 1;t ￿ 45) 9.8 11.7
Section B: The Log Consumption Regression
Variable Data Sims
fLit = 1g ￿0:121 ￿0:072
fLit = 2g ￿0:184 ￿0:146
fLit = 1gDI 0:276 0:131
fLit = 2gDI 0:486 0:260
DI ￿0:278 ￿0:008
Employed 0:456 0:337
Controls: Age, Age2, Unearned income, Permanent income
Section C: Labor Market Participation by Disability Status
Age band No limit Moderate Severe
Data Sims Data Sims Data Sims
23-32 0.98 0.99 0.87 0.96 0.47 0.46
33-42 0.98 0.99 0.88 0.93 0.31 0.38
43-52 0.98 0.97 0.80 0.82 0.21 0.30
53-62 0.88 0.89 0.53 0.64 0.10 0.23
31In Table 6 we report the Indirect Inference parameter estimates corresponding to these
moments. We estimate that a moderate (severe) disability induces about a 4% (8%) loss
of utility in terms of consumption. Participation induces a 32% loss.27 The ￿xed costs of
work per quarter rise substantially with the degree of disability. We estimate that a job is
destroyed on average every 26 quarters. The probability of success of DI application increases
with age and disability status. Each DI recipients faces a 5% probability of being re-assessed
after the ￿rst period on DI. The estimates of the success probabilities by type (age and work
limitation status) provide information on the extent of type I and type II errors, which we
discuss further in the next section.
Table 6: Estimated Parameters
Frictions and Preferences Disability Insurance Program
Paramter Estimate Parameter Estimate































FL=2 Fixed cost 1:20
(0:0072)
[$3646] P Re 0:050
(0:00038)
Fixed costs are reported as the fraction of average o⁄ered wage income at
age 23 and also in 1992$ per quarter. Standard errors in parenthesis.
5.5 Implications: Flows onto and o⁄ DI
We use our model to simulate the rate of ￿ ows on and o⁄ DI by work limitation status,
and we compare these to rates in the data. We did not use these in the estimation because
27An alternative way to estimate the preference parameters ￿ and ￿ is through a formal Euler equation,
using as instruments for the change in disability status and the change in participation past values of the
variables. We obtain estimates for ￿ of -0.036 (s.e. 0.060) and for ￿ of -0.597 (s.e. 0.155). The Sargan
statistic has a p-value of 66%. The ￿rst-stage F-test is 746 for the change in disability and 365 for the
change in participation. It is comforting that two di⁄erent estimation stategies give very similar results for
the two parameters of interest (albeit less precise).
32these moments are imprecisely estimated in the data. However, we reproduce in Table 7 the
main ￿ ow statistics and the simulated counterparts as an indication of the performance of
the model.
Table 7: Flows onto and o⁄ Disability
Data Simulations
Flows onto DI
Fr(DIt = 1jDIt￿1 = 0;Lt = 2;t < 45) 0.12 0.12
Fr(DIt = 1jDIt￿1 = 0;Lt = 2;t ￿ 45) 0.19 0.29
Fr(DIt = 1jDIt￿1 = 0;Lt = 1;t < 45) 0.0055 0.016
Fr(DIt = 1jDIt￿1 = 0;Lt = 1;t ￿ 45) 0.033 0.023
Flows o⁄ DI
Fr(DIt = 0jDIt￿1 = 1;Lt = 2;t < 45) 0.109 0.109
Fr(DIt = 0jDIt￿1 = 1;Lt = 2;t ￿ 45) 0.079 0.049
5.6 Implications: Success of the DI Screening Process
One important issue is to evaluate the success rate of the current DI Screening Process.
We ￿rst look at the Award rate: Pr(DI = 1jDIApp = 1). We estimate this rate (using
our structural model and estimated parameters) to be 0.40. During the period covered by
our data (1986-92), there were 3.3 million awards made to 7.8 million applicants, resulting
in a 42% average success rate.28 Our estimate contrasts quite well also with the reduced
form estimates (0.45) obtained by Bound and Burkhauser (1999) and others using data on
individual DI application and DI receipt from the HRS.
Given that the true disability status of an applicant is private information, SSA eval-
uators are bound to commit two types of errors: Admitting into the DI program unde-
served applicants and rejecting those who are truly disabled. Our estimates show how large
are the probabilities associated with these errors. Consider ￿rst the extent of false posi-
tives (the proportion of healthy applicants who receive DI). From Table 6, these type II
errors have probabilities ranging from 0.2% (young non disabled) to 14% (older workers
with a moderate disability). Similarly, we can use our model to estimate the Award Error:
28See Table 26, Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, 2000.
33Pr(L = f0;1gjDI = 1;DIApp = 1) = 0:10. In the literature, we have found reduced form
estimates that are fairly similar, 0.16 to 0.22 in Benitez-Silva et al. (1999), depending on
the statistical assumptions made, and 0.19 in Nagi (1969).
Consider next the probability of false negatives (i.e., the proportion of severely disabled
who apply and do not receive DI). From Table 6, we estimate that the type I errors are
65% for the younger and 28% for the older workers. The fraction of rejected applicants
who are disabled, the Rejection Error, is given by Pr(L = 2jDI = 0;DIApp = 1) = 0:43.
This is again similar to Benitez-Silva et al. (1999), who report 0.52-0.60, and Nagi (1969),
0.48. These comparisons con￿rm that our structural model is capable of replicating quite
well reduced form estimates obtained using direct information on the application and award
process. Our estimated award process is slightly more e¢ cient than previous estimates, but
the di⁄erences are slight.
Finally, with an estimated reassessment rate of 5%, we predict that an individual on DI
is expected to have his disability status reviewed approximately every 20 quarters.29 To get
a gauge of the actual numbers involved, consider that during the ￿scal years 1987-1992 (the
years covered by our sample) the SSA conducted a total of 1,066,343 Continuing Disability
Reviews (CDR). Subtracting from the stock of disabled workers in current payment status
the ￿ ow of awards for each year, we calculate a probability of re-assessment of 7%.
6 Reform of the DI Process
The most important use of our model and structural estimates is the ability to analyse the
e⁄ects on welfare and behaviour of changing the main parameters of the DI programs. We
consider four changes: ￿rst, making the program ￿stricter￿by increasing the threshold that
needs to be met in order to qualify for bene￿ts; second, changing the generosity of disability
payments; third, changing the reassessment rate of disability recipients; and ￿nally, we
consider changing the generosity of the food stamp programme. For each scenario, we study
the implications for welfare, for the e¢ ciency of the DI process and for behaviour more
generally. We calculate the welfare implications by measuring the willingness to pay for the
new policy through a proportional reduction in consumption, ￿; at all ages which makes
29By law, the SSA is expected to perform Continuing Disability Reviews (CDR) every 7 years for indi-
viduals with medical improvement not expected, every 3 years for individuals with medical improvement
possible, and every 6 to 18 months for individuals with medical improvement expected. In practice, the
actual number of CDRs performed is lower.
34the individual indi⁄erent between the status quo and the policy change considered.30 The
policy changes we consider generate behavioral e⁄ects, such as changes in labor supply and
savings. In all the experiments below the impact on the government budget is neutralised
by adjusting the wage tax iteratively using equation (6).
6.1 Strictness of DI Admissions
Increasing the strictness of DI admissions has been advanced as one possible solution to the
incentive problem. Increases in strictness in 1980 led to sharp declines in in￿ ows onto DI,
although the criteria was relaxed again in 1984. The issue is whether the bene￿t of improved
incentives outweighs the worsening insurance. To tackle this issue, we need ￿rst to de￿ne a
measure of strictness of the program.
Suppose that Social Security DI evaluators decide whether to award DI as a function
of a noisy signal about the severity of the applicant￿ s disability status, which has some
distribution:
Sit s f (L;t)
The properties of the distribution of the signal S vary by age (for simplicity, for two
age groups de￿ned by age<45 and age￿45), and by work limitation status L. The Social
Security DI evaluators make an award if Sit > S. The parameter S can be interpreted as
a measure of the strictness of the DI program: ceteris paribus, an increase in S reduces the
proportion of people admitted into the program.
We assume that S lies between 0 and 1 and has a Beta distribution, ￿ (aL;t;bL;t); whose
parameters a and b vary with age and work limitation status. The values of aL;t and bL;t and





= CDF (￿ (aL;t;bL;t))
30This is obtained by calculating expected utility at the start of the life-cycle before the resolution of any
uncertainty.
31We normalise the mean of the signal, S; for the old who are severely disabled and the mean of S for the
young who are not at all disabled to being 0.6 units apart, and we impose that the parameter b is identical
across age and work limitation status. These normalisations, alongside the use of the Beta distribution,
impose a particular distribution on the signals which we do not have the data to test. We considered
alternative assumptions, such as a normal distribution with age and disability shifting the mean of the
signal, and our results are qualitatively similar. The intuitive advantage of the Beta distribution is that the
precision of the signal increases as true disability status worsens.
35Figure 3 illustrates the resulting distributions of S for those over 45 by work limitation
status, and illustrates some of the errors under the estimated DI program. The area on
the left of S under the dashed light grey curve (labeled f(SjL = 2;t ￿ 45)) measures the
probability of rejecting a deserving DI applicant. The area on the right of S under the
solid grey curve (labeled f(SjL = 1;t ￿ 45)) measures the probability of accepting into
the DI program a DI applicant with only a moderate disability. Increasing the strictness
of the test (increasing S) reduces the probability of false positives (reduces the extent of
the incentive problem), but increases the probability of false negatives (reduces the extent
of insurance provided by the program). It also can have substantial e⁄ects on who applies.
A policy of changing S therefore has both bene￿ts and costs, trading o⁄ incentives against
insurance, and we use our model to determine which dominates when the strictness of the
test changes.32
Figure 3: The Distibution of S for the Older Worker by Work Limitation Status
Figure 4 reports the results of this experiment. The left-hand graph shows the implica-
tions for the DI program, the right-hand graph shows implications for welfare, participation
and asset accumulation. Increasing ￿ S from 0.65 to 0.95 reduces the probability of accep-
tance for the severely disabled over 45 from close to 100% to less than 10%. This has a direct
e⁄ect of increasing the rejection error as L = 2 individuals are more likely to be rejected.
Furthermore, the increase in ￿ S reduces the proportion of applicants from those with no or
only a moderate disability. This is shown in the downward sloping broken line (labelled
32An alternative policy might be to reduce the noise involved in the evaluation of the signal. We do not
evaluate such a policy. In theory, we could take the cost of extra SSA evaluations as being the same as the
cost of a review. However, the di¢ culty is estimating the e⁄ect of evaluations on reducing the noise.
36￿False Applications￿ ), and this implies a fall in the actual number of healthy who are re-
jected. Corresponding to this fall in healthy applicants and lower rate of acceptance, there
is a clear decline in the fraction of awards being made to the healthy or moderately disabled
(the Award Error). Conditional on the composition of applicants, increased strictness means
fewer applicants are made awards, but the composition of applicants also changes, with fewer
false applicants, and this means that the fraction of awards made does not decline monoton-
ically as strictness increases (the Award Rate). The cost of increasing strictness is seen in
the decline, as ￿ S increases, of the fraction of the severely work limited who are insured (the
line labeled ￿Insured (L = 2)￿ ).
Figure 4: The E⁄ects of Varying Strictness
The right hand graph shows the incentive e⁄ects of the alternative ￿ S, as well as the
willingness to pay. For all variables considered, the y-axis measures the proportional change
relative to the baseline.33 There is a direct e⁄ect of greater strictness leading to greater
participation in the labor force as more people are rejected or discouraged from applying.
This is particularly apparent for the severely work limited. For the moderately work limited,
there is an o⁄setting e⁄ect: as strictness increases, individuals expect to have to self-insure
and so accumulate more assets. These assets reduce participation rates among those who
are rejected by DI, and so participation can fall as strictness increases through this indirect
mechanism. The e⁄ects on participation for those who are not work limited at all are
negligible.
33We show participation rates only for those over 50 because the e⁄ects on participation at earlier ages are
qualitatively similar. The line ￿Assets￿shows how the maximum average asset holding over the life-cycle
varies.
37The willingness to pay increases as ￿ S decreases from its estimated value: the gain in
improved insurance from making the program less strict dominates the loss associated with
increased numbers of false applicants and a greater award error. The magnitude of the gain
in terms of consumption equivalent arising from reducing strictness from its estimated value
to ￿ S = 0:65 is about 0.05 (0.5%). This gain is the net gain of two o⁄setting e⁄ects: there
is a bene￿t of increased insurance against disability which individuals are willing to pay
for, but this is partly o⁄set by a loss arising from output being lower as individuals work
less. Part of the bene￿t of the relaxed strictness arises from the moderately disabled and
the severely-disabled young being o⁄ered better insurance. The key to this conclusion of
reduced strictness being welfare increasing is, however, the low acceptance rate of severely
disabled individuals onto DI in the baseline.34
6.2 Generosity of DI Payments
Figure 5 shows the e⁄ects of proportional changes in DI generosity, with the proportional
changes ranging from a cut to 30% of its current value to a 50% increase. The budget impact
of all changes are neutralised by adjusting the wage tax iteratively using equation (6).
Increasing the generosity of DI payments increases sharply the fraction of applicants who
are not severely disabled (the ￿False Applications￿line on the left-hand side). This in turn
leads to an increase in the award error and in the fraction of the moderately disabled who are
receiving insurance (the ￿Insured (L = 1)￿line shows this fraction for those 45 and over).
The fall in the rejection error arises mechanically: greater numbers of false applicants mean
the fraction of the rejections who are severely disabled falls. What is striking is that there
is very little change in the fraction of the severely disabled who receive insurance (the line
￿Insured (L = 2)￿ ), and this is because applications for DI from this group are insensitive
to the generosity of DI.
Given these e⁄ects, the welfare implications of changing generosity shown in the right
hand graph of Figure 5 are not surprising: increases in DI generosity funded by a wage
tax reduce welfare, and a 10% increase in generosity implies a welfare loss of 0.13% of
consumption. The broader incentive e⁄ects of changing generosity vary by work limitation
status: for the severely work limited, greater generosity has the direct e⁄ect of encouraging
applications for DI and individuals move out of the labour force. The greater generosity
34We have considered various alternative speci￿cations for the distribution of the noise over work limitation
status and this conclusion remains. See also Denk and Michau (2010) for a similar result obtained using a
dynamic mechanism design approach to the insurance-incentive tradeo⁄.
38Figure 5: The E⁄ects of Varying DI Generosity
also reduces asset accumulation, and this has the indirect e⁄ect of increasing participation
among those who are rejected, particularly among the moderately work limited.
6.3 Reassessment of DI Recipients
In Figure 6, we consider changing the reassessment rate. Given our estimate of the cost
per reassessment, this has a direct impact on the budget, as well as the e⁄ect induced by
changes in the number of recipients and in labour supply. These e⁄ects are again neutralised
through adjusting the wage tax. We assume that the probabilities of success, conditional on
work limitation status and age, are the same at reassessment as at initial application.
The left-hand graph shows that an increase in the reassessment rate discourages false
applications by those who are not severely disabled: an increase in the reassessment rate
from a 0.02 probability per quarter to a 0.08 probability, leads to a decline in the proportion
of false applications from 54% to 30%. This in turn leads to a decline in the award error, and
a decline in the fraction of the non-work limited who receive insurance. For the moderately
disabled who are 45 or over, the decline is from 24% to 10%. The cost of this is the reduced
coverage for the severely disabled: reassessment causes some severely disabled to be removed
from DI and this directly reduces coverage, as well as discouraging applications, as the
frequency of reassessment increases.
Despite this cost, increasing the reassessment rate increases welfare, albeit modestly,
with the consumption equivalent of increasing reassessment from the baseline of 0.05 to
0.06 being 0.043%. Increased reassessment increases participation among the severely work
39Figure 6: The E⁄ects of Varying Reassessment Rates
limited, who are discouraged from applying or removed from the DI rolls. This also leads to
greater saving, which discourages participation, particularly among the moderately limited.
6.4 Generosity of The Food Stamp Program
Figure 7: The E⁄ects of Changing the Generosity of Food Stamps
Figure 7 shows the e⁄ects of changing the generosity of food stamps. Increases in food
stamps have a non-monotonic e⁄ect on the number of false applications: when food stamps
are very low, the waiting period for a decision about a DI application is costly for those of
low productivity and they do not apply. Increasing food stamps (a "consumption ￿ oor")
40mitigates this cost, and leads to greater numbers of false applicants. After a point, however,
food stamps are su¢ ciently generous that false applications for DI fall. This e⁄ect translates
into the fraction of those not severely disabled who are in receipt of DI (the ￿Insured (L = 1)￿
line shows this for those 45 and over) and into the award error: both of which decline as
food stamps become su¢ ciently generous. By contrast, the fraction of the severely disabled
who receive DI increases as food stamps become more generous: this highlights the bene￿cial
e⁄ect of food stamps making it less costly for the severely disabled to remain out of work
and to apply for DI. In addition, more generous food stamps provide direct insurance against
low productivity with no risk of rejection. Together, these e⁄ects imply substantial welfare
increases as the generosity of food stamps, funded by a wage tax, increases. A 10% increase
in generosity implies a welfare gain of 1.4% of consumption. This is despite the fall in
participation and the fall in saving that greater generosity induces for all types.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we provide a life-cycle framework for estimating the extent of work-limiting
health risk that individuals face and for analysing the e⁄ectiveness of government disability
insurance against that risk. Work limitations have substantial e⁄ects on wages, with wages
falling by 40% for the severely work limited. Government insurance against these shocks is
incomplete: There are substantial false rejections. We estimate that 26% of the older workers
with a severe work limitation who apply for bene￿ts are rejected. This is alongside other
negative e⁄ects, with some workers discouraged from applying because of the uncertainty
surrounding the application process. Similarly, there are large rates of false acceptances,
with between 10 and 14% of applications from those with a moderate work limitation being
accepted.
We use the model to simulate various policy changes aimed at improving the insurance
and mitigating the incentive costs of DI. These are intended to illustrate the trade-o⁄s
from the various policy options. Increasing the strictness of the screening process through
increasing the work limitation threshold for quali￿cation reduces the number of individuals
receiving bene￿ts among both the severely work limited and among the healthy because of the
noisiness of the signal of work limitation status. Thus increased strictness leads to a decline
in welfare because the existing program already su⁄ers from turning down large numbers of
severely disabled. For other reforms, the simulations show that the number of moderately
disabled individuals receiving DI is particularly sensitive to the policy parameters, whereas
41the number of severely disabled is less sensitive. Thus, reducing DI generosity leads to a fall
o⁄ in false applications and mis-directed insurance, without reducing applications from the
severely disabled. Of course, the severely disabled will then receive less insurance, but this
change increases welfare ex-ante. Similarly, increasing the generosity of Food Stamps leads
to a fall o⁄in false applications for DI and mis-directed insurance, leading to better targeting
of DI and a welfare improvement. More frequent reassessments of recipients directly reduces
the number of claimants who are not severely work limited, but equally importantly more
frequent reassessments substantially reduce the proportion of false applicants. This leads
to welfare gains. In summary, welfare increases if the threshold for acceptance is lower,
disability payments are lower, reassessment more frequent and food stamp payments more
generous. The conclusions arose because welfare improving reforms lead to a separation of
the severely work limited from the moderately limited for whom work is a realistic option.
One di¢ culty with this conclusion is the clear non-linearities in behaviour apparent from
the simulations in section 6.
In terms of extensions, our model of the disability insurance process is incomplete:
Benitez-Silva et al. (2004) have emphasised the importance of the appeal process, whereas
we have allowed the social security administration to make just one decision. In the con-
text of capturing behaviour over the life-cycle this may be less problematic, but it means
we cannot examine one dimension of reform, namely the strictness and length of the appeal
judgement relative to the initial judgement. A second restriction is in terms of the stochastic
process for work limitations, which we take to be exogenous. The probability of receiving a
negative shock to the ability to work is likely to be partly under individuals￿control, through
occupation choice and other decisions on the job. These decisions will be a⁄ected by the
properties of the disability insurance scheme.
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